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Abstract 
Social interaction is not random. There is not a single prototypical social interaction; they 
are guided and functional. This begs the question, why do we interact with particular individuals 
initially and how to we maintain these interactions over time? How do we explain initiating 
social interactions and how do we explain interaction extended in time? Social-cognitive 
approaches to person perception argue that social cognition is the detecting particular types of 
person characteristics about others (i.e. sex and race) for use during interaction. Yet, this 
approach does not account for perceptual-motor processes like biological motion or coordination, 
which are known to impact social interaction broadly. The ecological perspective has been 
successful in explaining behavior in terms of perception and action. Here, social cognition is 
conceptualized as an emergent outcome of a nested system of agent-environment and agent-
agent-environment perception action systems that realize behavioral opportunities for 
interaction—or said differently, social affordances. As both the social-cognitive and ecological 
approach have contributed to our understanding of initial interaction, this project combined these 
approaches to understand how movement and movement coordination relate to social cognition 
and a particular social affordance, interact-ability.  
It was expected that biological motion would specify invariant person characteristics (i.e. 
sex and race) and movement coordination would be associated with greater prosociality and 
interact-ability. To test these hypotheses I employed a mixed design in which participants 
coordinated with kinematic information or kinematic information embedded in body structure 
and subsequently made target characteristic judgments. Results indicated that movement 
kinematics were necessary but not sufficient for sex detection, and that kinematics embedded in 
body structure afforded more accurate detection. Race was not detectable from biological 
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motion. Movement coordination was also unrelated to interact-ability or detection accuracy for 
sex or race.  Results indicated that both dynamic and structural properties are influential in 
determining the sex of an individual from their movement patterns. For race, results supported 
race as a social construction, rather than a biomechanical constraint. Coordination stability was 
conceptualized as a task constraint on social cognition. Theoretical contributions and 
implications are discussed in terms of interaction-dominant dynamical systems and complexity, 
as it relates to the study of social cognition more broadly.  
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Introduction 
Humans are embedded in social context. We have the potential to interact with others in a 
myriad of different ways: a smile in passing, a short conversation while standing in line at the 
grocery store, playing a game with friends, a performance review with a supervisor, a dance, 
repeated interactions with friends or a partner across various contexts, a marriage proposal, a 
surgical team performing an emergency procedure, etc. The interactions and tasks we perform 
together allow us to accomplish shared goals, as well as, establish and maintain various types of 
relationships. These interactions also vary in level of familiarity, complexity, purpose and 
extension in time. To interact, we must accurately detect and use social information. Successful 
detection of this information allows us to distinguish individuals and simultaneously provides 
feedback on how interactions unfold over time. We must also coordinate with each other such 
that tasks are accomplished effectively and appropriately. Yet, there is not a single prototypical 
social interaction. Moreover, interaction is not random. Interaction is functionally defined in that 
it is guided during ongoing production by some purpose (e.g. satisfying belongingness needs). 
This functional property of social interaction is what allows us to understand and organize the 
social world in terms of how others relate to us and how they facilitate our own actions.  
The question remains, when and why do we interact with specific individuals, and what 
specifies particular types of interactions? Traditional social psychology suggests that social 
cognition, defined as an implicit and highly automatic information processing activity, guides 
ongoing behavior with others (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). This approach has been valuable 
since social psychological research has clearly demonstrated that categorical person knowledge 
(e.g. race, sex), behavioral knowledge (e.g. relationship history, exposure, prior behavior) and 
dispositional characteristics (e.g. personality, attitudes, self-esteem) interact to impact sociality. 
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In this way, interactions are functionally adaptive behaviors that maintain stable and unique 
understandings of particular individuals in the service of effective and adaptive social exchange 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010; Kenny, 2004). Moreover, interactions 
overwhelmingly prosocial. While there are examples of situations where prosocial behavior is 
not observed (e.g. social loafing or diffusion of responsibility) or where prosocial behavior is not 
desirable (e.g. avoiding an attack), most often we seek out others. As such, a traditional social 
psychologist would make the general argument that we forage for others who are self-similar and 
possess qualities associated with pro-sociality (e.g. liking, attractiveness, trustworthy, etc.). This 
explanation also implies that interactions with others are guided by executive cognitive processes 
that match characteristics of others with our own since representation and cognition are assumed 
to guide and implement these procedures. As such, we must understand how we gather and 
integrate social knowledge.  
One criticism of social cognition by executive control is that perception is given for free. 
Some have noted that we do not fully understand how perceptual processes influence social 
cognition because explanations rely primarily on cognitive representation to explain social 
interaction and behavioral prediction (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). In essence, social cognition 
has been reduced to disembodied cognitive processes whereby abstract representations have been 
given explanatory power in social perception. This is to say that representations impinge upon 
social perception during interaction, which may alter behavior as a function of representational 
content. Additionally, this approach does not sufficiently recognize the role of coordination in 
social cognition, even though movement and coordination directly impact outcomes of social 
interaction (e.g. rapport and liking) and have even been argued to be fundamental to social 
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behavior more broadly (e.g. Hodges & Baron, 2007; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; 
Richardson, Marsh, & Schmidt, 2010; Runeson & Fryholm, 1983).  
As such, research that addresses how perceptual processes, including movement coordination, 
reveal social information during ongoing and dynamic social interaction with others is needed. 
Determining how these processes influence the varying level of intimacy and temporal nature of 
interactions themselves needed to if social cognition is in fact embodied and embedded. 
Furthermore, if movement coordination underlies social cognition more broadly, qualities of the 
coordination (e.g. stability) are likely to be systematically associated with social characteristics 
(e.g. accurate judgments of categorical or behavioral knowledge). By understanding how these 
processes produce detectable information that specifies different possibilities for interaction, we 
can conceptualize social cognition as an emergent outcome of a system in which perception, 
action and cognition are irreducible and dynamically intertwined, in line with ecological theories 
of human behavior (Gibson, 1979). Ecological theory (Gibson, 1979) also suggests that like 
other environmental objects, humans provide opportunities for action—affordances. Social 
affordances are defined as the possibilities for interaction provided by other conspecifics, in our 
case, other people. This conceptualization allows for a complementary way of understanding 
person perception and social interaction that can address the aforementioned gaps in our 
understanding of social cognition and interaction. In this way, social cognition is conceptualized 
as emerging from the mutual constraints and functional couplings amongst processes (cognition, 
action and perception), agents and environment, and agents themselves, rather than as a product 
of a social homunculus that guides our interactions with others.     
The current project takes this approach to social cognition by examining two concepts 
related to the emergence of social cognition. Specifically, the current project examined one 
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social affordance; “interact-ability,” and how nested levels of interact-ability are specified by 
information that relates individuals—movement coordination. Additionally, the current project 
identified what social knowledge is accurately detected about targets at zero acquaintance from 
movement kinematics and how this knowledge may be influenced by the stability or quality of 
interpersonal movement coordination. Overall, the role of coordination in the ongoing realization 
of interact-able and its impact on the accuracy of person perception will be addressed to establish 
the degree to which movement coordination underlies social interaction. In sum, this project was 
the first to address the social affordance “interact-ability” by examining how and what 
information is detected that specifies social knowledge and potential for interaction.   
Social Cognition 
The traditional understanding of person perception is that we develop interaction schema 
by integrating isolated information about ourselves, others, and behavioral actions in order to 
predict future behavior and make sense of ongoing social interactions (Macrae & Quadflieg, 
2010). In support of this interactionist approach, Kenny (2004) has found that people utilize both 
categorical and behavioral knowledge to make judgments about others, and to predict how 
someone will act given a specific context. He also demonstrated that we integrate these two types 
of data to form individualized schema about individuals (Kenny, 2004). Here, categorical 
knowledge refers to nonverbal behaviors, appearance characteristics, stereotypes based on group 
membership, or other immediately detectable cues that place individuals into general classes. 
Behavioral knowledge is defined functionally in that behavioral knowledge imparts meaning to 
an individual’s actions. As such, there must be information we are sensitive to that conveys both 
types of social knowledge. Moreover, and because people able to accurately detect 
characteristics about strangers immediately (at zero acquaintance), it is reasonable to hypothesize 
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that this information is available at zero acquaintance. Furthermore, because all potential 
relationships start at zero acquaintance and move toward extension in time, there may be 
information available at initial acquaintance that specifies when to interact with a person, or sets 
the initial trajectory that makes someone more or less interact-able over time. 
Researchers have been interested in the type of judgments we make about others at zero 
acquaintance for some time. The predominant methodology used to study zero acquaintance is to 
have a participant view a short (between 200 ms and 5 minutes) sample of behavior, a “thin 
slice” that includes one or more behavioral channels (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000). A 
behavioral channel refers to the perceptual modality that contains information available for 
making judgments (e.g. a video with sound, a video without sound, a static picture, etc.). One 
goal of this paradigm is to identify the particular informational variables that people use to make 
accurate judgments about others. Thin slices have been shown to be sufficient for predicting a 
wide variety of behavioral and dispositional characteristics including: affect, personality traits, 
interaction motivation, social relationships between actors, bias, job performance, quality of 
relationship, gender, sexual orientation, and others (see Ambady, Bernieri & Richeson, 2000 for 
review). While static pictures or isolated audio are sometimes used in the thin slice paradigm, 
more often movement is one of the behavioral modes that produces information available for 
making target judgments. Yet, the particular movement patterns associated with accurate 
judgments of specific characteristics have yet to be established. 
Interestingly, individuals who move more are more accurately and reliably judged than 
less expressive individuals (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000). Also, longer (4-5 minute) 
behavioral samples do not increase prediction accuracy compared to shorter samples between 
200-400 ms, yet it is well known that as interaction time increases the utilization of behavioral 
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knowledge compared to categorical knowledge increases (Ambady, Bernieri & Richeson, 2000). 
Together, these findings suggest that brief movement supplies some information that is integral 
to accuracy and reliability when forming person percepts, but additional information is gained 
from social interaction extended in time. Movement is hypothesized to provide this type of 
information. As such, it seems that initial movement dynamics are a good candidate for 
specifying categorical person knowledge, while coordination dynamics during interaction may 
specify another type of social information, behavioral knowledge, over time. Said differently, 
one hypothesis is that individuals may be sensitive to categorical person characteristics from 
movement alone, while coordination between individuals has the potential to specify another’s 
behavioral characteristics, and their level of interact-ability for future contact. Support for this 
hypothesis would suggest that in both cases perception-action processes may underlie social 
cognition more broadly as suggested by various ecological and social psychological theorists 
(e.g. Hodges & Baron, 2007; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; Miles, 2008; Richardson, 
Marsh, & Schmidt, 2010; Runeson & Fryholm, 1983).  
Macrae and Quadflieg (2010) have argued that person knowledge is based on two 
specific perceptual determinants—invariant and variant cues. Invariant cues are not context 
specific, like sex, race, age, or other visual information, and are analogous to categorical 
knowledge described above (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). Variant cues, like behavioral 
knowledge, propagate social information and include dynamic signals like eye gaze direction and 
head-body orientation (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). Importantly, both invariant and variant 
person knowledge are integrated in order to maintain stable understandings of other conspecifics 
and to interact effectively (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). This perspective is similar to Kenny 
(2004), but differs in how explanatory power is given perception and cognition. Kenny (2004) 
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gives more importance to computational processes that integrate different types of knowledge, 
while Macrae & Quadflieg (2010) argue that perceptual-motor processes are more fundamental 
to social cognition. Importantly, the hypothesis that we are sensitive to information that specifies 
both categorical and behavioral person knowledge is consistent with both perspectives. 
Extending the idea that perceptual-motor processes underlie social cognition (Macrae & 
Quadflieg, 2010), it could be that general categories are initially detectable from movement, and 
with continued interaction movement coordination provides feedback on the degree to which 
interaction can be maintained or extended in time. Furthermore, movement coordination may 
facilitate accuracy during initial detection of categorical and behavioral characteristics.   
Although social psychologists often contend that initial person perception is a function of 
schema that allow us to speed up the information processing processes used for the behavioral 
prediction that facilitates social interaction, an alternative for studying social interaction and 
person perception is provided by affordance theory (Gibson, 1979), discussed in the next section. 
In this case, categorical/invariant knowledge detected at zero acquaintance is hypothesized to be 
specified by movement kinematics alone. Similarly, extended social interaction is the realization 
of the social affordance interact-ability, which is detectable from information generated by the 
target-perceiver system (movement coordination) that specifies interaction behaviors by 
revealing prosocial characteristics that facilitate successful and efficient social exchange.  
Affordances and Social Affordances 
Affordances are directly detectable behavioral possibilities that are specified via 
information that relates animal and environment in terms of an animal’s action capabilities 
(Gibson, 1979). Because affordances are directly perceived and specified by information, 
cognitive mediation and information processing are unnecessary—behavioral options are not 
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deduced; they are realized (Gibson, 1979). This means that affordances do not rely on 
disembodied and abstract cognitive processes to explain behavior. Instead, an affordance is both 
subjective in that it is detected from the perspective of particular animal embedded in a particular 
environment, yet is also objective in that information arises from available energetics that can be 
detected by an animal (Baron, 1979).  For the current project, social cognition is defined as an 
ongoing affordance detection process in which movement provides the necessary energetics that 
specify particular behavioral opportunities for interaction. Humans provide affordances for other 
humans. While Gibson did not distinguish between affordances provided by objects versus 
conspecifics, he did suggest the concept of a “mutual affordance,” the affordances provided by 
other humans, rather than being exclusive to objects (1979). He also argued that humans provide 
the most interesting and rich opportunity for affordance research (Gibson, 1979).  
As previously stated, a social affordance is a possibility for interaction and is different 
from other affordances in particular ways. A social affordance must be mutually defined as a 
relation between conspecifics, which detected and dynamically realized. Thus, a social 
affordance is irreducible to a single relation between agent and environment, although these 
relationships certainly do not cease to exist and are not subjugated with respect to social 
affordances. This means that the proper unit of analysis for a social affordance is the agent-
agent-environment system in which information still lawfully specifies behavioral possibilities 
for interaction. To be clear, a social affordance is not the detection of an individual affordance in 
coordinated time and space by multiple animals (c.f. Baron, 1979). As stated by Gibson (1979), 
affordances are nested, thus it is reasonable to hypothesize that for complicated behaviors like 
social interaction, agent-agent relationships at the dyadic or group level are embedded in agent-
environment interactions at the individual level. By adding the word “social” in front of 
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affordance, this means the system actualizing the affordance is a perception-action system at the 
interpersonal level. This seems to imply a different level of affordance for dyads in which agent-
agent relations specify behavioral possibilities that drive interaction—social affordances. This 
idea has been captured by research investigating interpersonal synergies in which individuals 
form a self-organized system capable of coordination on various tasks in which behavior is an 
emergent property of the entire system, such as rhythmic movement (Riley, Richardson, 
Shockely, & Ramenzoni, 2011) and dialogue (Fusaroli, Rączaszek-Leonardi & Tylén, 2014).  
That coordination precedes control is not novel (Bernstein, 1967). Furthermore, it is well 
recognized that specific types of coordination will depend on context, with general coordination 
principles remaining similar across time and across tasks (Turvey, 1990). This means that rather 
than an actor simply detecting behavioral possibilities from an object with static (or very slowly 
changing) properties, a social affordance like interact-ability is characterized by a reciprocal 
information generation process whereby co-actors both produce and detect information that 
specifies possibilities for interaction, in coordinated time and space.  Here, information specifies 
particular opportunities for interaction and drives future interactional states by relating co-actors 
to each other. This is not in place of individual relations with the environment for each actor, but 
in addition to, or nested with, those real possibilities for action. This begs the question, what 
information specifies particular social affordances like initial interact-ability or approachability, 
and does this information constrain person perception? 
Because a social affordance is defined as an opportunity for interaction there are many 
affordances that one might provide another. It is likely that what makes someone interact-able is 
not dichotomous, but rather scales in time and intimacy. A person might be “hello-able,” “smile-
at-able,” “date-able,” “friend-able,” “cooperate-able,” or infinitely many other degrees of 
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interact-able. Yet for any of these higher-order social affordances that involve repeated 
interaction across time, one must have a certain level of interact-ability that must be realized 
repeatedly. If one is not initially interact-able, one is never date-able, friend-able, teammate-able, 
etc. Yet, coordination is by definition a process that occurs because of non-singularity and 
coupling across individuals, and as such, one may not be coordinated with another actor prior to 
interaction. This means there must be a different source of information, not coordination, that 
specifies initial interact-ability, or characteristics that signal that one has properties that make 
them a good candidate for interaction.   
In light of the discussion above, there must be both a source of information that specifies 
both initial interact-ability as well as information that specifies interact-ability over time. While 
movement kinematics may specify initial categorical knowledge about others (discussed below), 
it is coordination between agents that is hypothesized to continuously specify and maintain 
interact-ability. This means that coordination should also relate to more positive evaluations of 
characteristics that would signal potentially positive interaction partners or prosociality. As the 
study of coordination dynamics has been used extensively to understand joint action, many 
contemporary researchers have suggested that our understanding of coordination and movement 
dynamics could be extended to the study of social affordances and social interaction more 
broadly (Baron, 2007; Miles, 2008; Richardson et al., 2010; Schmidt & Richardson, 2008; 
Warren, 1984). Yet, empirical validation of what information makes someone interact-able 
initially or over time has yet to be established. Fortunately, an extensive literature on the 
relationship between movement and social interaction can be used to link initial person 
perception and level of interact-ability from initial acquaintance to more complex social 
interactions across time. 
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Social Cognition, Biological Motion and Interact-ability 
Movement is important to the current project in two ways. First, because categorical 
knowledge about others often impacts social interaction quite extensively, and in light of the 
literature on thin slice judgment, it is possible that movement dynamics may provide information 
that directly specifies categories that are highly relevant to social cognition (e.g. sex and race). 
Second, because social affordances are, by definition, agent-agent relations, and movement 
coordination has been demonstrated to characterize many interpersonal interactions, movement 
may specify either target characteristics (e.g. likability, status, etc.) or potential quality of 
interaction over time, or both. Because coordination specifies a mathematical relationship 
between co-acting agents and an individual’s movement is visually detectable, both are potential 
candidates for specifying categorical and behavioral knowledge about others, as well as, interact-
ability. One promising area of research that provides a methodology for testing this informational 
specification is biological motion. For the present discussion, biological motion will be used to 
refer to movement produced by a human.  
First described by Johansson (1973), point light displays have been used to identify the 
type information available in biological motion and how we use this information quite broadly.  
A point-light (PL) display is a dynamic video that reduces whole body movement to bright 
markers placed on major joints. Point light displays retain kinematic information but eliminate 
all other sources of person knowledge by rendering body structure invisible and isolating visual 
information such that only potential sole source of information comes from joint movements 
represented by moving dots on a screen (Johansson, 1973). This is important because it allows us 
to distinguish characteristics that are informationally specified by movement alone from those 
that may be specified by other types of information (e.g. visual cues like skin complexion). 
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Furthermore, because movement is determined by kinematics (mechanics of motion) and motion 
is governed by dynamics (properties of objects that are causally involved in the course of 
movement) kinematics reveal the underlying dynamics, which specify properties of some object. 
As such, humans perceive potential opportunities to interact with objects by detecting dynamic 
properties that specify what can be done with or from some moving entity, including other 
humans (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). This is to say that because dynamics are lawfully related 
kinematics, social affordances and person knowledge could specified by information available in 
movement because movement provides information that implicates the underlying dynamics of 
social interaction. If this is the case, socially relevant knowledge should be perceptible from 
movement, which prior research has demonstrated for particular movement patterns like gait. 
Kozlowski and Cutting (1977) have demonstrated that the sex of a walker could be 
detected from a dynamic point light display. Cutting and Kozlowski (1977) found that 
information in gait allowed subjects to categorize strangers and friends accurately. Gait 
dynamics also impact trait impressions of power, happiness, and youthfulness, masculinity, 
easygoingness and approachability (Montepare & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988). Furthermore, the 
social affordance “attack-able” is also kinematically specified by gait (Gunns, Johnston, & 
Hudson, 2002). Research that examines how other types of social behaviors (e.g. dancing, 
playing games, etc.) specify categorical or behavioral characteristics that impact interact-ability 
(e.g. race, personality, liking etc.) is needed. This could provide support for the hypothesis that 
an individual’s movement implicates socially relevant information and specifies initial interact-
ability, which can explored by repeated interactions that produce information, coordination, used 
for maintaining interaction over time. As such, interaction tasks in which people coordinate with 
each other should both increase the accuracy of judgements we make about others’ 
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characteristics, if coordination facilitates extended interact-ability. This is in line with the idea 
that we are better at predicting the actions of those we interact with more often because we have 
more accurate categorical and behavioral knowledge about our interaction partner. Furthermore, 
coordination may specify more intimate interactions because we do not find individuals we 
coordinate well with to be unpredictable or awkward. Because some types of person knowledge 
(e.g. sex, age) are likely linked to differences in kinematics or biomechanical constraint, while 
other differences (e.g. race, individual differences) may be more likely to be linked to differences 
in an individual’s dynamics, it is important to determine how these categorical and behavioral 
constraints are specified. It could be the case that only biomechanical constraints are 
kinematically specified, or it could be the case that movement gives us a sampling of the 
underlying dynamics that operate at more complex levels of functioning, like social interaction. 
As such, determining which variables are specified by an individual’s movement kinematics and 
which variables are specified by movement coordination between actors is a goal of the current 
project.   
Related to coordination, we do not often seek out negative or difficult interactions with 
others. This means that stable coordination should increase pro-social behavior and positive 
interaction outcomes, especially if it is the case that coordination specifies continual interact-
ability and higher levels of intimacy via more accurate person knowledge and greater 
predictability. In line with this, Miles, Nind and Macrae (2008) showed that coordination impacts 
rapport such that rapport was highest when gait patterns were coordinated and stable. Even when 
coordination is measured or manipulated at an extremely coarse scale (e.g. when people choose 
the same bet as each other), coordination increases positive evaluations of another person’s 
intelligence, self-similarity, and like-ability (Abele & Stasser, 2008). Miles, Griffiths, 
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Richardson and Macrae (2010) have hypothesized that coordination may be a way to regulate 
interpersonal relationships in that those who we like are imitated, while those we do not like are 
not. This would seem to suggest that disruptions of coordination specify not-interact-able and 
cause individuals to disengage, as is the case with the observed interferences of bodily synchrony 
that occur during disagreements (Paxton & Dale, 2014). Together, this motivates the hypothesis 
that coordination can both increase the degree to which we make positively evaluate others, as 
well as, indicate that we should interact more often, or in more intimate ways, with those we 
coordinate with well.  
This idea is not new to social psychologists. Mimicry is synonymous with interpersonal 
synchrony and coordination (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) and is defined as the 
copying of postures, mannerisms, gestures, facial movements or other’s behavior (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). It is bidirectionally and positively associated with affiliation and rapport and 
functions to adaptively initiate and maintain positive social relationships, like coordination 
(Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). Kouzakova, Karremans, van Baaren and van 
Knippenberg (2010) found that for those who were not mimicked during an interaction, current 
relationship evaluations were moderated by increased belongingness needs. As such, they argued 
that lack of mimicry during interpersonal interaction hampers sense of belonging (Kouzakova, 
Karremans, van Baaren and van Knippenberg, 2010). Furthermore, it is difficult to decrease 
behavioral mimicry although the goal to disaffiliate seems to disrupt coordination (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013).  
As such, one way to unify the ecological and social psychological perspectives on how 
individuals synchronize with each other, is to assess how coordination impacts interpersonal 
variables associated with pro-sociality and mimicry, by assessing how coordination stability is 
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associated with co-actor judgements of categorical knowledge (e.g. sex and race), positive social 
characteristics (e.g. like-ability, trust, rapport), and intentions to interact in more intimate 
situations (e.g. sharing a meal or introducing to friends).  
Current Project 
Overall, the research described above suggests three things. First, that movement is 
information that specifies target characteristics (e.g. sex, traits) and social affordances (e.g. 
attack-ability, approach-ability). Second, that coordination is associated with pro-social behavior 
and often characterizes positive social interactions. Finally, that coordination may serve to 
specify continual interaction by facilitating accurate person perception, which allows for 
additional opportunities for interaction. These three findings motivate the hypothesis that 
movement underlies social cognition because movement produces kinematic information that 
reveals dynamic person knowledge and coordination facilitates accurate person perception and 
specifies interact-ability. 
Yet, it is unclear how biological motion is used to make accurate predictions about 
targets in terms of person knowledge, and what target characteristics are detectible from 
movement kinematics in more ecologically valid tasks beyond gait. While various types 
categorical and behavioral knowledge can be detected directly from biological motion (e.g. 
stranger/friend, sex, etc.), to date, no studies have addressed whether race or initial evaluations of 
interact-ability are specified by kinematics.  Moreover, no studies have assessed whether 
coordination specifies ongoing possibilities for interaction or if coordination facilitates more 
accurate, or more positive, predictions of target characteristics, as suggested by previous 
research. As such, the proposed project will address these gaps in the literature and test the 
hypothesis that movement underlies social cognition and potential for interaction. 
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Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Invariant knowledge (sex and race) will be detectable at zero acquaintance from 
kinematic information alone (point light displays) and kinematic information plus body structure 
(depth array), but accuracy will be greater with additional body information.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Coordination stability will be positively related to performance accuracy in 
detecting invariant person knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Coordination stability will be positively associated with interact-ability, such that 
more stable movement coordination will be associated with increased likelihood of interaction.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Coordination stability will be positively associated with pro-sociality and more 
positive judgements of target characteristics. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included forty (n = 40) undergraduate students from the University of 
Cincinnati, a majority of whom were female (72.5%) and Caucasian (82.5%). Participants ranged 
in age from eighteen to forty-five (M = 21.18, SD = 5.78). Partial course credit was given in 
exchange for participation. All subjects were right handed and free from any known neurological 
or musculoskeletal disorder and had normal or corrected to normal vision.  
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Materials 
Actor Movements.  
Stimuli (described below) were created from eight human actors who volunteered to have 
their movements recorded to be used in the experiment. Four volunteers identified as Caucasian 
(two male/two female) and four identified as African-American/Black (two male/two female). 
All actors were between 5’9” and 6’0” tall, of similar body type, and around the same age (18-26 
years old). Actors were instructed to produce three different types of movements: jumping jacks, 
marching in place, and side-to-side shuttle steps. Their movements were recorded using the 
Xbox Kinect at 21 frames/second. During the recording procedure, all actors wore a skin tight 
latex suit and a beanie style hat in order to eliminate any information that might be used to 
identify sex or race (i.e. hair length/style and clothing) and standardize the stimuli. Actors 
produced each movement type three times continuously for two minutes. The middle 15 seconds 
of the second trial for each actor was used to create all stimuli used in the experiment. Actors 
were unaware of which movements would be used and were instructed to produce each 
movement as naturally as possible. No other instructions were given for any of the movements 
other than the shuttle step, in which actors were instructed to move side to side in a four step 
pattern (two steps to each side). The resultant movement time series included the x, y, and z 
position of sixteen joint markers used to create experimental stimuli. Both point light and depth 
array displays used the same movements for each actor and each movement type. This means 
that the exact same movements were used for both stimulus types for each actor and movement, 
such that the only difference between the two was how the information was displayed (dots vs. 
image) and available information (kinematics vs. kinematics + body structure).  
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Point Light Displays.  
 A total of twenty-four point light displays were created and included one sample of each 
of the three movement types for each actor (three movements x eight actors). Point light displays 
were displayed on a blue background with a red dot representing each of the joint markers, with 
the head dot slightly larger than the rest of the markers (see Figure 1). A computer program was 
created to display the movements at the sampling rate that also height normalized each actor to 
fit the screen. Height normalization maintained the proportionality between joints and simply fit 
the display to the computer monitor. The point light displays retained kinematic information 
while removing all other sources of actor information beyond movement. All displays were 15 
seconds in length. 
Depth Array Displays.  
 A total of twenty-four depth array displays were created and included one sample of each 
of the three movement types for each actor (three movements x eight actors). Depth array 
displays included an outline of the body structure in a black and white image (see Figure 1). 
These displays were played via a computer program that played the series of images recorded by 
the Xbox at the sampling rate. Depth array displays were not normalized in any way. The depth 
array displays retained the same kinematic information as point light displays but also included 
visual cues to depth (as can be seen in the room outline) and body structure of the actor. No other 
social information was available (e.g. complexion). All displays were 15 seconds in length.  
 19 
  
Figure 1. Example point light display (left) and depth array display (right). 
 
Demographic Questionnaire. 
 Participants completed a demographic questionnaire on an iPad using SurveyGizmo 
online software (SurveyGizmo, 2015). Demographic information collected included: age, sex, 
race, Big-Five personality assessment (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann Jr., 2003), and self-reported 
assessments of participants’ sociability, friendliness, and feelings of power, mood, and status 
assessed on a five point Likert-type scale.  
Stimulus Questionnaire. 
 Participants completed a questionnaire on an iPad using SurveyGizmo online software 
(SurveyGizmo, 2015) to make target judgments. Participants indicated the sex, race, and age of 
the stimuli. For sex and race, a forced choice design was used (male vs. female; white vs. black). 
For age, a range was used (18-30) in which participants selected one age to indicate their 
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prediction. Next, they indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with statements (five point 
Likert-type scale) assessing behavioral/variant knowledge about the stimulus. These included: 
liking, attractiveness, approachability, ease of cooperation, self-similarity, rapport, sociability, 
friendliness, power, mood, and status. Last, they indicated how likely they would be to interact 
with the stimulus by answering the following questions on a five-point Likert-type scale from 
disagree to agree: I would feel comfortable approaching this person, I would say hi to this person 
if I passed them in the hallway, I would avoid eye contact with this person, I would ask this 
person for directions if I was lost, I would make small talk with this person, I would want to get 
to know this person better, I would introduce this person to my friends.  
Procedure 
 The current project employed a mixed design with stimulus type (point-light and depth 
array), sex and race of actor, and movement type as within subjects variables, and coordination 
vs. no coordination as a between subjects variable. The primary dependent variables were target 
judgements of sex, race, dispositional characteristics and interact-ability. Participants entered the 
lab under the guise of participating in an experiment to help design avatars for a virtual reality 
dancing game. The experiment was first described to participants upon entering the lab who were 
told they would be making several types of judgements about two different characters. They 
were told that their responses should be their first impression of the character, but to be as honest 
and accurate as possible so that our avatars would be as lifelike as possible. No other instructions 
on the composition or characteristics of the stimuli were given. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the coordination or no coordination group. The no coordination group was instructed 
to stand about 5 feet from a 50” computer screen while viewing the stimuli. Participants in the 
coordination group were told they should “Coordinate with the stimulus so that you do the same 
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thing at the same time as the avatar on the screen” and were located the same distance from the 
computer monitor as those in the no coordination group. In all cases, participants were told 
which type of movement would be shown, counted down from three to start the video, and filled 
out the stimulus questionnaire immediately following each stimulus. Participants viewed stimuli 
in randomized blocks so that each participant viewed all of one type of stimulus (either depth 
array or point light) and subsequently viewed all of the other type of stimulus. Within stimulus 
type stimuli were randomly presented to each participant. Participant movements were recorded 
by the Xbox Kinect at 21 frames per second on each trial for analysis. Upon completion of the 
experiment participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Results 
Sensitivity to Sex and Race 
 We hypothesized that invariant information (sex and race) would be detectable at zero 
acquaintance from kinematic information alone (point light displays) and kinematic information 
plus body structure (depth array), but accuracy would be greater in the depth array condition. 
Results partially supported this hypothesis. We calculated d-prime (d’) values for sex and race in 
both the point light and depth array conditions, which is a measure of signal to noise sensitivity. 
First, we tested these values against chance levels (d’ = 0 at chance) to determine if participants 
were able to accurately detect sex from point light displays and depth array displays.  
For sex, results of the one-sample t-tests indicated that participants were able to detect 
sex above chance levels when movements were produced by men in both the point light, t(37) = 
2.334, p = .025, and the depth array, t(37) = 20.368, p < .001, conditions. Similar results were 
obtained for detecting sex when movements were produced by a woman. Results of the one-
sample t-tests indicated that participants were able to detect sex above chance levels when 
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movements were produced by women in both the point light, t(35) = 3.634, p = .001, and the 
depth array, t(37) = 21.346, p < .001, conditions. Furthermore, results of a paired samples t-test 
indicated significant differences in d’ in the point light condition compared to the depth array 
condition for sex detection for male movements, t(33) = -12.603, p < .001, and female 
movements, t(33) = -13.909, p < .001, such that participants were more accurate in the depth 
array condition in both cases. Figure 2 summarizes these results.  
  
 
Figure 2. Kinematic specification of sex as a function of condition. * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
  
For race, results did not support our hypotheses. Participants were unable to detect race 
above chance levels in the point light or the depth array conditions when movements were 
produced by either a white or black actor. There was no statistical difference in d’ values 
between point light and depth array conditions. Figure 3 displays these results.  
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Figure 3. Kinematic specification of race as a function of condition.  
Coordination Stability 
 All of our other hypotheses were related to the quality, or stability of the movement 
coordination. As such, we calculated a measure of stability, cross-spectral coherence (COH), to 
quantify the degree to which participants and stimuli movements were synchronized. COH 
ranges from 0 in the case of completely non-synchronized systems, to 1 in the case of perfectly 
synchronized systems. As participants were positioned such that they were facing the stimuli we 
calculated COH for joints on opposite sides of the body in all cases (e.g. participant right hand to 
stimulus left hand). We chose the following joints for analysis. For jumping jacks, we used the 
average of the left and right wrist joints’ COH in the z-plane (up and down). For both marching 
and shuttle steps we used the average of the left and right hip joints’ COH in the x-plane (left to 
right). As such, we were able to collapse COH values across different planes and different 
movement types in order to maximize power. We do not report differences in the coordination 
compared to the no coordination group here, as this did not seem to be the appropriate control 
since coordinating and not coordinating were fundamentally different tasks. We also believe this 
 24 
is valid since there were no differences in sex or race detection as a function of coordination 
grouping. Instead, we examined how the stability of coordination, as measured by COH, 
impacted the variables of interest.  
 For point light stimuli, there was no impact of coordination stability on sex or race 
detection. Specifically, there was not a significant difference in COH values on correct trials, 
compared to incorrect trials for either sex detection (p = .88) or race detection (p = .49). Results 
on depth array trials were consistent with this finding such that there were no significant 
differences in COH for sex detection (p = .783) or race detection (p = .727). We also calculated 
bivariate Pearson correlations between coherence and d’ values on a subject by subject basis and 
did not find a significant association for either point light trials or depth array trials (all ps > .05). 
Combining all trials types also showed a similar pattern of results in that there were no 
differences in COH values on correct compared to incorrect trials for both sex (p = .106) and 
race (p = .565). COH values were also not associated with any individual difference variables 
including ratings of interact-ability (all ps > .05). As such, our second, third and fourth 
hypotheses were not supported.  
 Finally, we examined matched pairs for sex and race to determine if differences in 
coordination stability emerged as a function of same-sex or same-race pairs. There were no 
significant differences. Same-sex and opposite sex pairs were statistically indistinguishable in 
both the point light (p = .77) and depth array conditions (p = .865). As for same-race and 
different-race pairs, the same pattern emerged. There were no differences in coordination 
stability as a function of racial pairings in either the point light (p = .709) or depth array (p = 
.936) conditions.  
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Additional Data Analyses 
 We also conducted several other data analyses. Based on exit interviews and 
observational notes from experimental sessions, we thought it could be the case that there were 
differences in how well participants were able to coordinate with different actors. As such, we 
used the stimulus actor as a grouping variable in a series of one-way ANOVAs to examine 
differences in variant knowledge judgments, interact-ability and coordination stability.  
 Results indicated significant differences in some variant characteristic judgments, but not 
others, as a function of stimulus actor. Considering both point light and depth array judgements 
we found no differences in liking, attractiveness, approachability, rapport, sociability, 
friendliness, mood, and all measures of interact-ability. For cooper-ability, self-similarity, 
powerfulness, and status there were differences across actors, but these differences did not show 
any patterns related to sex or race. For coordination stability we found that the actor mattered. 
There were significant differences in the stability of the coordination as a function of the actor 
that produced the movement (p < .001). Although all actors had high COH levels, meaning they 
were all easy to coordinate with, there were differences amongst them (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Differences in COH as a function of actor. Significance values are Bonferroni post hoc 
tests. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 Because of the differences in coordination stability as a function of actor, we also thought 
it would be wise to examine the extent to which individuals actors producing a specific 
movement type were associated with variant behavioral characteristics and interact-ability. As 
such, we looked at the bivariate Pearson correlations between COH and judgements of 
behavioral characteristics and interact-ability as a function of actor and movement type. COH 
was associated with different characteristics for different actors and movement combinations. 
There did not seem to be an overall pattern to the relationships. Table 1 displays significant 
correlations between variant characteristic judgements and COH for the point light display 
condition only. Table 2 displays significant correlations between interact-ability and COH for the 
point light display condition only.  Table 3 displays significant correlations between variant 
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characteristic judgements and COH for the depth array condition only. Table 4 displays 
significant correlations between interact-ability and COH for the depth array condition only.  
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Discussion 
 Human beings rely on their ability to gather social knowledge from observing other 
humans’ actions (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007). The current project tested the hypothesis that 
biological motion and movement coordination underlie social cognition and interact-ability. We 
sought to demonstrate that movement kinematics were sufficient to set an initial interaction 
trajectory because invariant person characteristics known to impact interaction would be 
detectable from movement, specifically someone’s sex and race. Furthermore, we hypothesized 
that when people coordinated their movements the stability of this coordination would not only 
positively impact characterizations of someone at zero acquaintance, but would also be 
associated with increased interact-ability, or likelihood to interact. To test these hypotheses we 
had participants view short videos of joint movements and body movements, which were 
produced by black and white, male and female, actors. Participants coordinated with these videos 
or simply watched them, and subsequently made judgements on a variety of person 
characteristics, as well as, rated their likelihood to interact with them in various situations. In 
general, we found little support for our hypotheses, which will be discussed in terms of extant 
literature below. We will also discuss theoretical implications of this research and situate this 
conversation in the context of movement and social interaction more broadly. 
Sex 
Our first hypothesis was that sex would be detectable from kinematic information alone, 
and that the addition of body structure would increase this sensitivity. Our results were consistent 
with this hypothesis. In this sense we were able to replicate prior research on sex detection from 
biological motion, and extended this literature by demonstrating the robustness of this 
phenomenon for movements beyond gait (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; Mather & Murdoch, 
 33 
1994; Sumi, 2000; Troje, 2002).  In the point light condition participants were able to discern if 
movements were produced by a male or female actor at levels above chance. In the depth array 
condition, sex recognition sensitivity was drastically increased—participants identified sex with 
nearly perfect accuracy. This implies while kinematics alone are insufficient to characterize sex 
detection, which deviates somewhat from existing literature on the topic (as discussed below), 
although it should not be understated that we were able to replicate prior research on sex 
detection from kinematic information broadly.   
Race 
 To date, no studies have addressed the extent to which biological motion underlies race 
categorization. Understanding how we determine the race of a potential interaction partner is 
important because the assumed race of an individual can have a significant impact on social 
interaction, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of the current project. We found no 
evidence that race can be detected from biological motion. Even the addition of body structure 
did not impact sensitivity. This is likely because there are not biomechanical constraints on race 
in the same way there are biomechanical constraints on sex. Said differently, white and black 
individuals have the same variation in body type across race as variation within their respective 
races. Our lack of support for the kinematic specification of race may explain why this effect 
does not show up in the literature on biological motion—the effect may not exist. As such, those 
interested in determining how race is specified should look to potential cues beyond movement. 
Interact-ability 
We hypothesized that not only would coordination show similar effects to other 
interpersonal coordination and mimicry studies in terms of person knowledge, but also that 
coordination would specify the social affordance interact-ability. The current project did not find 
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support for either of these predictions—coordination stability was unrelated to person perception 
or interact-ability in any systematic way. This means that interact-ability may not be specified by 
coordination, at least not initially. Overall, and discussed in greater depth below, we come to the 
general conclusion that coordination, at least for our task, functions as a context specific 
constraint on social cognition. While interpersonal movement coordination is often associated 
with pro-sociality, it does not seem to be required for interact-ability, as demonstrated by the 
current experiment. This seems reasonable in that we cannot initiate an interaction via 
coordination because without interaction there is no opportunity to coordinate. That being said, it 
does seem reasonable that coordination may serve as an indicator that we are doing something 
pro-social or are interacting in a specific way (e.g. affiliating), although we did not find any 
direct evidence of this in the current study. Future research should address this possibility 
specifically. It also seems reasonable to consider other possibilities for information that specifies 
interact-ability, or coordination in other modalities outside of movement (e.g. similar status, 
clothes, vocal tones, etc.). Perhaps it is also a good idea to consider that interact-ability may be 
too broad. It could be the case that hello-able, high five-able, walk-with-able, etc. are more likely 
candidates for social affordances. This is also consistent with typical affordance research in 
which affordances tend to be reduced to specific activities (e.g. pass-through-able, climb-able, 
grasp-able, etc.). Miles (2008) is a good example of how this work should be continued as he 
demonstrated the affordance of approachability varied as a function of facial expression and sex.  
Theoretical Implications 
 Our findings implications for sex and race detection, as well as, for the study of social 
affordances and with respect to coordination. Each will be discussed below in turn. 
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Our results have clear consequences for the study of how sex is perceived from biological 
motion. While point light displays have provided great insight into the degree to which 
movement is responsible for perceptions of sex, it is also clear that we do not encounter walking 
dots in our everyday lives. Kozlowski and Cutting (1977) were first interested in investigating 
the structural invariant that participants used to identify sex from a point light walker. They 
demonstrated that “roughly speaking, any joint is sufficient and no joint is necessary for the 
recognition of a walker’s sex” (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977, p. 578). Furthermore, they did not 
make any claim as to whether differences arise from biomechanical or socialization processes, 
only that accuracy appears to hover around 70%. Sumi (2000) also found similar results in that 
when walkers were viewed as eight point displays, sex identification was around 80%. These 
results are consistent with sensitivity to sex in the point light condition in the current project.  
However, if kinematics alone were sufficient to discriminate sex, one would hypothesize 
a non-significant increase in recognition from the point light display condition to the depth array 
condition. We did not find this to be the case. Participants were almost universally perfect in sex 
recognition in the depth array condition. Accuracy was above 95% in almost all cases. 
Furthermore, when using principal components analysis to identify which joints contributed to 
the overall variability of movement we found that for all movements there were 2-4 factors that 
included nearly all joints across all actors which accounted for around 90% of the movement 
variability. While it is true that all kinematic information available in the point light display is 
also available in the depth array display, if kinematics were sufficient there should be a smaller 
margin. These results do not contradict with Kozlowski and Cutting (1977), but do seem to 
indicate that joint structure in relation to each other is likely more important than individual joint 
movements themselves. Another way to say this is that kinematics do not tell the whole story. 
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This begs the question, does structural body information simply add to accuracy or does it drive 
recognition?  
In line with a kinematic account of sex recognition, Mather and Murdoch (1994) sought 
to demonstrate biomechanical differences as the source of differences in walking patterns 
between sexes. They found that sex discrimination was mediated by these biomechanical 
differences, specifically lateral body sway in the shoulders and hips (Mather & Murdoch, 1994). 
Furthermore, they argued against a structural account because they determined that participants 
were able to discriminate the sex of a computer generated walker based on a fraction of a step 
cycle from a single joint. Their results are problematic for two reasons in light of the current 
study. First, their stimuli were produced from computer generated movements, not from real 
people. While this serves to manipulate the amount of sway for any joint and pragmatic this 
approach suffers real problems of validity. In the current project, the movements of real men and 
women are displayed, thus predictions of sex can be compared to biological sex, rather than 
artificially varied sway imposed on shoulder or hip joints. It is true that men and women have 
varying degrees of sway, but arguing that we recognize the sex of real people from sway based 
on eight participants characterizations of artificially enhanced gait patterns is not scientifically 
satisfying.  
In addition, they argued that kinematics were more powerful than structural information 
in discriminating sex (Mather & Murdoch, 1994). This claim is based on a manipulation of a 
“male torso” and a “female torso” in combination with varying permutations of sway. Again, 
they found that sway was more important in participants identifying sex rather than torso shape. 
This is in direct opposition to the current project in which we demonstrated convincingly that 
body structure drastically increases sensitivity to sex. This result is likely due to the fact that in 
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our experiment there was an objective measure of sex because movements were produced by real 
men and women, rather than manipulations of joint movements being characterized as male or 
female as in the Mather and Murdoch (1994) study. This also implies that information beyond 
that which is produced by movement impacts sex detection, but that kinematics have some 
explanatory power, or influence, in shaping our judgments of sex.    
Several other studies have demonstrated that dynamic properties of point light walkers 
are most important, rather than dynamics embedded in body structure. For example, Cutting 
(1978) found that shoulder movement and hip movement were sufficient for detecting sex. Troje 
(2002) demonstrated that exaggerating male and female movement patterns produced by real 
actors impacted sex detection such that when structural information was not present, 
performance was affected minimally, while in cases where dynamic information was not present 
sex became nearly undetectable (Troje, 2002). Furthermore, eye tracking has demonstrated that 
observers focus mostly on the hips when judging sex from point light displays (Troje, 2002). It 
seems that there is a general agreement that dynamic information is highly important, even if not 
sufficient for sex detection from point light displays of gait. As such, rejecting kinematic 
specification of sex out of hand seems unwarranted.   
Yet, some research indicates body structure has explanatory power in how we detect sex. 
For example, Runeson and Frykhom (1983) found that participants were still accurate at 
detecting sex from point light displays when actors were told to depict motions that were typical 
of the opposite sex. This means that simply acting like a different sex does not disguise the 
embedded dynamics imparted by biomechanical differences in body structure. Furthermore, 
some have argued that point light displays do not capture the correct variable used for 
discriminating sex from motion, which is likely the size and shape of the waist in relation to hips. 
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Importantly, this ratio is embedded in the overall body structure because it includes the waist, 
which does not have an associated principal movement joint. Because of this difference in male 
and female morphology, and the fact that point light displays eliminate this source of 
information, our results could be explained by the fact that the depth array contains this 
information. Johnson and Tassinary (2005) found support for this claim by manipulating the 
waist to hip ratio and asking participants to judge the sex and corresponding 
masculinity/femininity of walkers and found that judgements of sex were more accurate when 
waist to hip ratios were consistent with the actual gender of the walker. Furthermore, 
McDonnell, Jorg, Hodgins, Newell and O’Sullivan (2007) created virtual walkers with sex 
neutral gait patterns and applied these walking patterns to male and female figures. They found 
that neutral walking patterns were perceived as normal (meaning sex congruent) only when 
paired with body morphology. In other words, a sex neutral walk in a male figure is perceived as 
male and a sex neutral walk in a female figure is perceived as female—morphology takes 
precedence over joint kinematics (McDonnell et al., 2007). Additionally, Johnson and Tassinary 
(2005) found primacy for body shape in perceiving sex from biological motion. They 
demonstrated that visual scanning of point light walkers was concentrated on the waist and hip 
region, but this was attenuated by pre-specifying the sex of the walker (Johnson & Tassinary, 
2005).  
 For determining sex from biological motion it seems there are clearly influences of both 
dynamics and structural properties. In fact, Troje (2002) has developed a mathematical model of 
gait patterns that discriminates sex as a function of scaling a parameter alpha, which incorporates 
both structural and dynamic properties. In the current project we found evidence that supports 
the necessity of both kinematic and structural properties to explain sex discrimination from 
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biological motion. We replicated prior work on sex detection from point light displays and 
extended this work to include accuracy increases with the addition of body structure. 
Furthermore, our research was novel in the fact that we demonstrated that this claim is not 
isolated to gait patterns. It seems that for other movement patterns (i.e. jumping jacks and side-
to-side shuttle steps) joint kinematics must also be paired with structural body information to 
determine the sex of an individual from their movement patterns. It is also clear that body 
structure drastically increases accuracy of sex detection and is more ecologically valid. Humans 
are moving bodies with embedded dynamic properties, but are not reducible to joint kinematics 
alone.  
As such, it is important for researchers to be careful about claims that exaggerate the 
relative importance of kinematic variables, at least with respect to detecting sex from biological 
motion. This means that while movement is important, how movement is embedded in a body 
structure that is also moving is likely more relevant to the discussion. This also implies that 
movement research, especially research that is confounded by knowledge of the sex of 
participants or coordination pairs, should either address the issue of sex differences or control for 
them. Furthermore, it seems that same-sex and opposite-sex pairs are an unlikely confound for 
most research activities as the current project demonstrated that these pairs seem to coordinate in 
similar manners. 
 As for the kinematic specification of race, we found no evidence that race can be detected 
from movement kinematics or movement kinematics embedded in body structure. This implies 
that race is cued by some other informational variable, most likely complexion. Future research 
should examine the specific informational variables that specify assumptions about race. Our 
results are consistent with race as a socially constructed concept in which biological or 
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biomechanical differences do not underlie differences between those that identify as Caucasian 
and those that identify as African-American (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Our research is also 
consistent with research indicating that racial groups are not genetically discrete, and fuels the 
idea that historical context and cultural context are more likely constraints on racialized 
differences in behavior (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). As such, movement research that ignores 
race as a potential confound is probably safe from criticism unless the research includes 
manipulations or dependent variables also known to be impacted by race, or assumptions about 
race. More interestingly, race should be conceptualized as a possible constraint on the 
perceptions of synchrony or coordination (c.f. Lumsden, Miles, & Mccrae, 2012). 
There is a long history discussing the relationship between coordination and social 
interaction. In the ecological psychology literature interpersonal coordination and joint action 
have been studied at length, with some discussion of how coordination impacts interaction 
outcomes and person characteristics. Within the social psychology literature, mimicry and 
behavioral synchrony have been posed as highly influential features of social interaction that 
relate to outcomes.  Interpersonal synchrony has been claimed to underlie many social 
interactions and outcomes and even selected as an evolutionary principle for social cohesion, yet 
these results may often be exaggerated, overstated, or simply worded to reflect an exaggerated 
importance placed on coordination.  
For example, Oullier, de Guzman, Jantzen, Lagarde and Kelso (2008) argue that 
biological motion plays a key role in social coupling. Their article is even entitled Social 
coordination dynamics: Measuring human bonding (Oullier et al., 2008). Yet, there was no 
measure of social anything, no scale reflecting bonding, no questions asked about how much the 
other individual is liked or how attractive they were, etc. What they call social memory is in fact 
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nothing more than hysteresis, a phenomenon known to characterize complex systems and 
repeated behaviors. In sum, the human bonding they claim to underlie interaction is nothing 
more than a phase relationship in a finger tapping task. The tendency to not revert to an intrinsic 
baseline frequency after visual coupling between two individuals instructed to tap together, is 
described as the social memory effect (Oullier et al., 2008). As we found no systematic pattern 
that related coordination and self-similarity, affiliation, or rapport, it seems that our results are 
more likely to accurately reflect that role of coordination in true social bonding.  
Similarly, Hove and Risen (2009) have argued that interpersonal synchrony increases 
affiliation. They argue that synchrony promotes self-other overlap (in neural representations) and 
the outcome is affiliative tendency. In this case correlations between the likability ratings of a 
confederate who tapped in coordination with a metronome alongside a participant were 
moderately higher than ratings of likability when the confederate did not synchronize with the 
participant (Hove & Risen, 2009). To assess directional causality, a second experiment was 
conducted such that participants were asked to rate the experimenter’s clarity and friendliness 
while giving instructions, a supposed proxy for likeability. They also manipulated the degree of 
coordination. Results indicated that in the synchrony condition the experimenter was liked more 
than in the asynchrony condition. A closer examination of these results indicates that ratings of 
likeability were quite high in both the synchrony condition (M = 6.87) and the asynchrony (M = 
5.91) and the effect size was moderate (d = .74). The authors noted they controlled for baseline 
levels of likeability and mood, and it is possible that participants liked the experimenter more 
simply because they were doing a synchronous task, but not because of the coordination between 
the two individuals. Thus, in a third experiment they tested this idea by having the experimenter 
sit in the room but not tap along with participants. They found that likeability ratings were not 
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different as a function of condition, yet all likeability ratings in the third experiment were larger 
than in the first two. Hove and Risen (2009) do not discuss this issue. It could be the case that the 
difference in likeability in the second experiment was due to the fact that the experimenter was 
making the tapping task more difficult by being out of synch with the participant, which would 
decrease likeability. It is also a stretch to argue that likeability and affiliation are proxies for one 
another.  
The criticism that these results are likely confounded is supported by the current project. 
We did not find an association between coordination stability and likeability, affiliation, cooper-
ability, or rapport. If interpersonal synchrony drives affiliation as suggested by Hove and Risen 
(2009) one would expect systematic relationships in at least one, if not all, of the aforementioned 
social variables. Since we did not, this suggests that there was something intrinsic about the 
experimenter in the Hove and Risen (2009) studies. An alternative, though unlikely explanation, 
is that there is something intrinsic to tapping that causes affiliation, however this is not a 
satisfying explanation since affiliation is associated with many other behaviors beyond finger 
tapping.  
Similarly to research on interpersonal coordination, research in social psychology has 
also given explanatory power to mimicry and behavioral matching. Chartrand and Lakin (2013) 
have defined behavioral mimicry as when two or more individuals do the same behavior at the 
same time. This is also the definition of synchrony. It should also be noted that mimicry has been 
defined with a temporal lag between producer and mimicker (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005). In a 
set of seminal studies, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) argued that behavioral matching is automatic 
and related to pro-sociality. First, they had participants interact with a confederate, by choosing a 
series of stimulating pictures, in which the confederate was trained to shake their foot or rub their 
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face. They found that participants also shook their foot or rubbed their face unconsciously, and 
more often, when the confederate did so. In the next experiment they asked participants to rate 
how smooth the interaction was and how much they liked the confederate. In this experiment the 
confederate either mimicked or adopted neutral postures during the interaction. Again, those that 
were mimicked liked the confederate more and thought the interaction was smoother (Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999). This initial line of studies has led to a wealth of research on mimicry and 
behavioral matching, most of which concludes that coordinated behavior is associated with 
increases in prosociality.  
In the current project, we explicitly manipulated synchrony exactly quantified the degree 
to which individuals mimicked each other via coherence and for specific body segments (i.e. hips 
and wrists). There are several aspects of mimicry that our study failed to replicate despite the 
methodological rigor and precise quantification of mimicry present. For example, Bourgeois and 
Hess (2008) found that in-group members are more often mimicked than outgroup members. We 
found that for both same-sex and same-race pairs this was not the case. This was even true for 
trials on which the sex and the race of the participant was correctly predicted. As such, our 
results are not consistent with the idea that in-group members coordinate more with each other 
than with outgroup members. On the contrary, social perceivers judge synchrony to be less in 
pairs of synchronized hand movements when skin tones are dissimilar despite the fact that 
coordination was held quantitatively constant (Lumsden, Miles, & Mccrae, 2012). This means 
that there is something about the subjective experience of the coordination that must underlie 
these differences incorrectly attributed to quantitative differences in synchrony. It could be the 
case that synchrony at a coarser scale (e.g. having the same name predicts greater mimicry, 
Gueguen & Martin, 2009) is more impactful. Either way, because many studies have 
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demonstrated mimicry to be positively associated with affiliation there is likely a link between 
behavioral coordination and affiliative tendency (e.g. Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin and 
Chartrand, 2003). 
In general, it has been proposed that mimicry is exhibited to create affiliation and rapport 
during social interaction. In the Gueguen and Martin (2009) and Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
studies, mimicry is defined as doing a similar behavior to someone on a videotape. Furthermore, 
mimicry studies often boil down to self-similarity. For example, Burger, Messian, Patel, del 
Prado, and Anderson (2004) found that participants who were similar in birthday, name or body 
type to the confederate were more likely to act pro-socially toward the confederate. Heider 
(1958) proposed that these similarities create an association between individuals, which creates 
an enhanced positive perceptions of others, because of our desire view ourselves in a positive 
light. Again, self-similarity is seen as the driving force behind mimicry’s positive enhancement 
of targets. Even shared opinions can lead to more mimicry (Van Swol & Drury, 2006) and those 
who are viewed as more attractive are also mimicked more often (van Leeuwen, Veling, van 
Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). A criticism of all of these studies is that they do not quantitatively 
measure the degree to which people mimic, or coordinate, with each other. Another, but related 
problem with these studies is that mimicry is defined inexactly. In the current study, we were 
able to quantitatively measure the degree to which in people mimicked each other via coherence. 
We produced evidence that contradicts the claims made of many mimicry researchers. One 
potential reason for this contradiction is many mimicry studies are based on unconscious 
mimicry. Ours was not. Participants were explicitly told to coordinate with one another.  
Interestingly, this effect of intentionality also shows up in the interpersonal coordination 
literature. For example, people tend to synchronize with each other when they have an existing 
 45 
positive relationship (Miles, Griffiths, Richardson, & Macrae, 2010) or with whom they want to 
have a positive relationship with in the future (Miles, Lumsden, Richardson, & Macrae, 2011). 
Furthermore, if one has self-disclosed to an individual (a process that increases rapport, liking, 
trust, etc.) they tend to coordinate more (Vacharkulksemsuk & Fredrickson, 2012). Finally, 
simply having a prosocial orientation during interaction can facilitate interpersonal coordination 
(Lumsden, Miles, Richardson, Smith, & Macrae, 2012).Yet in these examples, coordinating with 
an individual was explicit in the instructions of the task. This raises the issue of how 
coordination relates to task social task constraints, how social cognition emerges.  
Conclusion 
 We set out to demonstrate that social cognition was an affordance detection process in 
which movement underlies person knowledge by producing information that guides interaction 
both initially and over time. Although we did not find overwhelming evidence to support this 
argument, our results do provide evidence that social cognition may emerge from the functional 
couplings and constraints that arise during interactions themselves. As such, the emergence of 
coordination during social interaction may revolve around intentionality and goal direction. For 
example, if the goal is affiliation or prosociality, or if there is an existing positive relationship 
amongst individuals, coordination may emerge from these constraints during a task like social 
interaction (c.f. Van Orden, 2010).  
 As such, we argue that social cognition emerges from an interaction-dominant dynamical 
system (IDDS) that includes co-actors embedded in social and historical context. A self-
organized IDDS is defined as a system lacking an executive controller in which interactions 
amongst components best describe the behavior of the overall system and demonstrate emergent 
behaviors (Van Orden, Kloos & Wallot, 2011). More importantly, cause is distributed and 
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heterarchical in an IDDS such that long time scales disproportionately constrain faster timescales 
and processes are organized from slow to fast in terms of their rates of change (see Figure 2; 
Eiler, Kallen, Harrison & Richardson, 2013). In the context of social cognition, slowly changing 
processes (e.g. one’s biological sex; the social construction of race) may constrain faster 
changing processes (e.g. initial interact-ability) which constrain even more rapidly changing 
processes (e.g. movement coordination during interaction). In the current study we found that 
virtually static processes (i.e. the sex of an individual) were most accurately judged when rapidly 
changing movements (kinematic information) were situated within more slowly changing 
contexts (body structure). Furthermore, we did not find evidence that race, a slowly changing 
cultural process, was specified by a more quickly changing process of biological motion. We 
also found coordination to be unrelated to sex or race detection. This makes sense in light of the 
idea that coordination operates at a much faster time scale than do an individual’s particular 
movement patterns, which have been constrained by prior life experience. It seems that for 
characteristics that operate on a slower time scale than interpersonal movement coordination, 
there were no effects of coordination. This is exactly what would be predicted if social cognition 
emerges from a self-organized IDDS. Another way to say this is that the functional couplings 
and constraints amongst these processes themselves impact the emergence of one’s perception of 
others. In other words, social cognition is an emergent outcome of a process in which social 
knowledge emerges continuously in time. In this conceptualization, our results are consistent. 
Yet, coordination was associated with target judgements, but differently as a function of 
individual actors’ movements. In this sense, coordination operated as a constraint on person 
knowledge. This is also predictable if social cognition emerges from a self-organized IDDS in 
that the more slowly changing task constraints (i.e. intention to coordinate with an actor’s 
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movement and corresponding quality of coordination) may impact knowledge of an actor’s 
properties, which operate at a time scale less extended in time. This implies that coordination 
may emerge as a function of the constraints (i.e. goal) of the interaction itself, as previously 
mentioned. This is consistent with a research indicating that task goals impact the type of 
coordination that emerges between individuals (e.g. Richardson, Harrison, Kallen, Walton, Eiler, 
Saltzman, & Schmidt, 2015; Schmidt, Nie, Franco & Richardson, 2014).  
Although coordination was related to some aspects of person perception, we did not find 
that coordination specified interact-ability over time. One reason we failed to demonstrate this 
effect may be that interact-ability is too broad a social affordance. Another, and more likely 
reason, is that coordination is, by definition, a relationship defined by more than one individual. 
Interaction is also defined as a non-singularity. As such, it is highly unlikely that two individuals 
would be coordinated in their movement patterns prior to interaction, if this is even possible at 
all. Most likely, information exists that specifies initial interact-ability via positive pro-social 
characteristics, but it is definitively specified by the stability of motor coordination. This does 
not mean that coordination is unimportant, but rather that coordination is just another component 
of social interaction, important when the task goal requires coordination to be completed 
successfully, as mentioned above.  
In sum, our research indicates that movement does not specify the social affordance 
interact-ability, neither initially nor via coordination for interactions extended in time. Yet, we 
found evidence that social cognition emerges from the nested processes of constraint that operate 
concurrently during person perception. Finally, we conclude that research on human movement, 
interpersonal coordination, and mimicry are insufficient for a complete characterization social 
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cognition and that researchers must include other processes and information to fully explain what 
humans afford other humans.  
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